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NASA STI Program . . . in Profile
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to
the advancement of aeronautics and space science.
The NASA scientific and technical information (STI)
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain
this important role.
The NASA STI program operates under the
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. It
collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI program
provides access to the NASA Aeronautics and Space
Database and its public interface, the NASA Technical
Report Server, thus providing one of the largest
collections of aeronautical and space science STI in
the world. Results are published in both non-NASA
channels and by NASA in the NASA STI Report
Series, which includes the following report types:
TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of
completed research or a major significant phase
of research that present the results of NASA
programs and include extensive data or
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of
significant scientific and technical data and
information deemed to be of continuing
reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers, but having
less stringent limitations on manuscript length
and extent of graphic presentations.
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific
and technical findings that are preliminary or of
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports,
working papers, and bibliographies that contain
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive
analysis.
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and
technical findings by NASA-sponsored
contractors and grantees.
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected
papers from scientific and technical
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA.
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific,
technical, or historical information from NASA
programs, projects, and missions, often
concerned with subjects having substantial
public interest.
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific and
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission.
Specialized services also include creating custom
thesauri, building customized databases, and
organizing and publishing research results.
For more information about the NASA STI
program, see the following:
• Access the NASA STI program home page at
http://www.sti.nasa.gov
• E-mail your question via the Internet to
help@sti.nasa.gov
• Fax your question to the NASA STI Help Desk
at 443-757-5803
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at
443-757-5802
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NASA STI Help Desk
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information
7115 Standard Drive
Hanover, MD 21076-1320
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Assessment / Evaluation Approach
NESC involvement was initiated by a dissenting opinion e-mail from Mr. Rick Wood
(NASA LaRC – AAAC) received on October 28, 2003. The dissenting opinion raised
three potential overarching aerodynamic issues. 1) Incomplete aerodynamic analysis of
Flight 1 (a failure to quantify all contributing factors); 2) The need to develop and/or
validate scaling laws for ground test to flight databases supporting Flight 2; and 3) The
need to correct known errors & deficiencies in ground based experimental &
computational data sets.
The NESC Director negotiated with the X-43A Return-to-Flight (RTF) Manager, Luat
Nguyen (NASA LaRC – Space Access & Exploration Program Office), to have these
issues addressed through the existing independent X-43A Flight Readiness Review
(FRR) process with NESC monitoring and evaluation. This independent technical forum
was staffed with the appropriate aerodynamic expertise to address the issues raised. If
necessary, the NESC would be available for a second look into how the X43A FRR board
dispositions the issues. Steve Labbe, acting NESC Discipline Expert for Flight Sciences,
was assigned as lead for this evaluation.
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The dissenting opinion originator documented his issues and concerns in Request For
Action (RFA) 20, included here as Reference 2, to officially initiate the X-43A FRR
Committee process.
Risk Assessment
The initial X-43A flight test, June 2, 2001, resulted in a mishap and loss of the vehicle. A
mishap investigation board (MIB) report and findings, including the established root
cause, were publicly released on July, 23, 2003. The X-43A Flight 1 Hyper -X Launch
Vehicle (HXLV) failed because the vehicle control system design was deficient for the
trajectory flown due to inaccurate analytical models (Pegasus heritage and HXLV
specific), which overestimated the (control) system margin – X-43A Mishap Investigation
Report, Vol. I. – included as Reference 1. Several specific errors were noted, 1) HXLV
aerodynamics – failure to model changes to wing, fin and rudder airfoil shapes due to
addition of thermal protection system (TPS); 2) Fin actuation system (FAS) modeling –
under prediction of the control surface hinge moments and FAS compliance; and 3)
Parametric uncertainties – insufficient variation in the aerodynamic, FAS and control
system models. In response to the MIB findings, the X-43A program has been working
RTF through an approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) over the last two years.
The aerodynamic issues raised in the dissenting opinion address the program’s risk
mitigation approach to encountering a roll disturbance during the boost phase. It was the
initiators technical opinion that the 2nd flight of the X-43A has a minimal chance for
success due to un-modeled and/or mis-modeled aerodynamic phenomena in the transonic
through supersonic Mach number range. There is good likelihood that the vehicle will
experience un-commanded rolling moments (roll disturbance) in the transonic flight
regime. Failure to manage the resulting disturbance magnitude could lead to loss of
vehicle. This mission success hazard (covered under X-43 Hazard Report (HR) No.
2602: Loss of Control: HXLV during boost) was classified by the program’s Risk
Management Board with a Severity of Category II – Loss of HXRV and a Probability of
D – Unlikely but Possible to Occur. Given the loss of vehicle during the boost phase on
Flight 1, an independent assessment of the issues raised in the dissenting opinion was
warranted. The X-43A programs Hazard Action Matrix is shown here, with HR No.
2602 classified.
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Data Reviewed
The NESC monitoring and evaluation of FRR assessment process included both face-to-
face meetings and teleconferences with the X-43A aerodynamic team, the FRR
aerodynamic experts and other aerodynamic consultations. The NESC reviewed in
detail, the RFA 20, the program response to RFA 20 (and associated reference material)
as well as the FRR assessment for content and applicability. The NESC confirmed that
the FRR was addressing each of the issues raised in RFA 20. The NESC did not conduct
a root cause analysis or an independent analysis of the RFA 20 issues.
X-43A Program Response to RFA 20:
The complete X-43A program response to RFA 20 is provided as Reference 3.
In summary, the X-43A program adopted a philosophy towards risk reduction and
mitigation that the program believes is conservative and appropriate for an X-vehicle
flight project. Recognizing that the HXLV is not intended to be a production unit, the
program weighed the upfront non-recurring costs associated with developmental testing
and analysis, against total program budget and risks. In response to the MIB findings and
recommendations, the program developed a CAP to support the RTF effort with a
number of aerodynamic related elements. All of the aerodynamic testing, analysis, and
modeling related actions have been fully addressed, and additional efforts above and
beyond those specifically outlined in the CAP have been exercised. These efforts
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encompass the RFA 20 issues. The program’s response deferred in the conduct of any
additional test or analysis in response to RFA 20, but rather addressed each specific issue
and provided appropriate references. It is the program’s position that the extensive
testing and analyses conducted, combined with the design approach of building in large
stability and control margins provide a high level of robustness to the issues raised in this
RFA. Documentation and references to the following work were provided and reviewed
by the FRR aerodynamic experts and the NESC.
The CAP and additional RTF aerodynamic activities included the following updates:
1) Took detailed measurements of the 2nd flight vehicle and developed new wind
tunnel model hardware and CFD geometries to match the “as flown”
configuration.
2) Conducted an extensive HXLV wind tunnel test program (10 test entries in 7
separate wind tunnel facilities) to completely redevelop the entire set of HXLV
aerodynamic data bases, including aerodynamic uncertainty levels.
The primary differences between pre and post-flight 1 wind tunnel testing were:
a. Correct modeling of TPS on the wing and fins.
b. Accurate wing to fin distance (resulted in 2” longer stack in full-scale).
c. Both left and right wings instrumented for wing root bending moment.
d. Addition of 2.5-degree fin deflections ( 0, 2.5, 5.0).
e. Added Mach 0.975 to test matrix.
f. Improved angle of attack and sideslip resolution in test matrix.
g. New HXLV model fin instrumentation and specific attention to
calibrations and data quality
3) Conducted a parallel Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) analysis effort.
4) Conducted independent reviews of all aerodynamic data derived from testing and
analysis to ensure that the databases utilized for flight simulation and autopilot
design are complete and accurate for flight 2.
5) Conducted extensive reviews of the first HXLV flight data and the available
Pegasus Launch Vehicle telemetry and identified “disturbances” that could be
attributed to aerodynamic related anomalies.
6) Utilized state-of-the art techniques and procedures developed by the joint
NASA/DOD Abrupt Wing Stall (AWS) Program experts to examine and
appropriately design for potential roll disturbances and dynamics, including
unsteady CFD, and simulation models.
Recognizing, however, that the state-of-the-art in transonic high-angle-of-attack unsteady
aerodynamics is such that it is not possible to predict these characteristics with a high
level of confidence, the project also took the approach of increasing the flight control
robustness.
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7) Designed the 2nd HXLV for flight control robustness to the possible adverse roll
disturbance characteristics by:
a. Modifying the trajectory to reduce the dynamic pressure (by ~50%) at
transonic conditions to reduce aero loads relative to available control
capability
b. Doubling the torque capability of the booster fin actuator to further
increase margin
c. Conducting autopilot trades to identify design options of enhancing
transonic flight dynamics robustness
d. Developing systematic uncertainty models and conducting appropriate
Monte Carlo trajectory simulation analysis
e. Conducting worst case stress cases to define the boundaries of
controllability.
These aerodynamic and flight control RTF activities are highlighted in the risk waterfall
charts here, addressing loss of HXLV aerodynamic control.
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Consequently, the X-43A program strongly believes that the associated risks have been
reduced to acceptable levels for Flight 2 and that these efforts encompass each of the
issues identified in RFA 20.
FRR Committee’s Review of Programs Response to RFA 20:
The X-43A program response formed the basis for the FRR committee’s review of RFA
20. The FRR aerodynamic experts spent a considerable amount of time discussing the
RFA and the program response. This included a face-to-face meeting at LaRC with the
project and the initiator of the RFA as well as numerous FRR meetings, teleconferences
and follow up discussions. The NESC monitored this FRR activity. The FRR
Committee’s final report was provided by letter, Reference 4, to the Airworthiness and
Flight Safety Review Board (AFSRB), and includes their complete review, assessment
and recommended disposition of the RFA 20 issues.
The FRR condensed RFA 20 and combined it with RFA 17 (Reference 6) into a single
overriding issue – the susceptibility of the HXLV to a wing rock/wing drop type of roll
disturbance brought on by sudden asymmetric flow separation on the HXLV wing. The
project thoroughly addressed roll disturbances in response to RFA 17 by developing a
roll disturbance model and conducting Monte Carlo and stress simulation analysis. Four
roll disturbance model variations were assessed. The model variations included the
disturbance magnitude, onset, frequency content and architecture (single triangle, triple
triangle, sinusoidal) as well as the flight condition at which the disturbance is
encountered. The largest roll disturbance observed in flight or wind tunnel testing was
equivalent to a rolling moment coefficient delta of 0.0043. The models included
magnitude variations up to a 0.01075 roll moment delta coefficient level, or 2.5 x 0.0043,
in the simulation analyses. The Monte Carlo analysis results indicate that the HXLV
flight control system meets all phase and gain margin requirements (Nominal 6dB Gain /
45deg Phase; Dispersed 3dB Gain / 20deg Phase) for all the variations analyzed.
Additionally, when the same dispersed parameter values that result in a very good match
of the Flight 1 loss of control are applied in the Flight 2 simulation, the predicted vehicle
motions are very benign. Linear analysis indicates that with these parameter values a
large stability margin (approx. 6 dB) is provided in flight 2, whereas similar analysis of
Flight 1 shows negative stability margin (-2 dB). Finally the "extracted" disturbance
models from Flight 1 data and Pegasus flight data were evaluated and flight control
system robustness was demonstrated.
Stress case analysis can be used to estimate the expected roll disturbance controllability
limit. When combined with a worst case combination of reduced roll damping, reduced
aileron effectiveness and other key parameters, the max roll disturbance level assessed
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can produce loss of control cases. This implies a roll disturbance margin factor of ~2.5,
when coupled with the simultaneous occurrence of these other dispersions.
Two members of the FRR aerodynamics team independently estimated the maximum
reasonable roll moments generated on the HXLV due to asymmetric flow separation.
Assuming flow separation over one entire wing would yield an equivalent rolling
moment coefficient delta maximum of 0.01. This maximum value is encompassed by the
levels analyzed in the program’s roll disturbance assessment. Thus, while the detailed
physics of possible flow separation may not be known prior to flight, it is the opinion of
the FRR aerodynamics team that the flight control system exhibits robustness to the
maximum estimated flow separation disturbance described by the initiator.
In summary, the FRR found that the RFA 20 initiator recommended closure on many
sub-issues associated with each of the three overarching technical issues. The FRR
determined that the project did respond to each issue, however for the most part, the
project response does not specifically accomplish what the initiator was asking. It is the
opinion of the FRR committee that in general, the requests were out-of-scope for this
project. Furthermore, the FRR found that the project response to this RFA demonstrates
a significant effort (wind tunnel and CFD) to understand the vehicle aerodynamics along
with a comprehensive Monte-Carlo trajectory analysis to assess the uncertainties. The
project recognizes there are aerodynamic uncertainties associated with this configuration
flying at high angle-of-attack at transonic conditions. The project has elected to ensure
through test and analysis with Monte-Carlo simulation stress testing, that the flight
control system is robust to the range of possible aerodynamic uncertainties and roll
disturbances predicted for the X-43 vehicle.
As reported to the AFSRB, the FRR aerodynamics team agrees with the project response
to RFA 20 and does not recommend any further testing or analysis as requested by the
initiator of the RFA.
NESC Monitoring and Evaluation of FRR Process regarding RFA 20:
The NESC believes that the X-43 FRR aerodynamic experts appropriately focused the
RFA 20 assessment and has verified that the X-43A FRR process adequately reviewed,
investigated and responded to the aerodynamic issues raised. The NESC confirmed the
independence, appropriate expertise, thoroughness, disposition and documentation of the
X-43A FRR Aerodynamic assessment of the programs response to RFA20. The program
provided extensive reference material (Wind Tunnel Test Reports, CFD Analysis
Reports, Aero Dynamic Data Base Development including uncertainties, Independent
Aero Uncertainty Evaluation, etc.), with its response to RFA 20. The NESC reviewed
this material and did not identify any technical issues in the material provided.
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Based on the programs reliance on a robust flight control system to mitigate the risks
associated with a potential roll disturbance encounter, the NESC requested support from
JSC Flight Control expertise (J. Ruppert). At NESC request, additional GN&C system
design and verification data was provided by the program. These presentations
documenting the GN&C system design and development, the certification process
(including multiple independent simulations), as well as the Monte-Carlo simulation
results, were reviewed for potential technical issues. No technical issues were identified
and appropriate stress testing of the GN&C system via multiple flight simulation results
was indicated.
These NESC findings were reported to the AFSRB on February 9, 2004 and the
Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) Integrated Mission
Assurance Review (IMAR) on March 11, 2004 and are documented in this report.
Updated Risk Assessment
A potential increased risk level was highlighted by the originator of a dissenting opinion
to the NESC. The NESC Director negotiated with the X-43A Program to have this
addressed through the existing independent X-43A FRR process with NESC monitoring
and evaluation. The FRR process has refuted the dissenting opinions higher level of risk
and independently confirmed the programs defined level of risk. As a result RFA 20 was
dispositioned with no further action. HR No. 2602, which encompasses the RFA 20
issues, remains classified as (II/D – Loss of Vehicle/Unlikely to Occur). This risk
assessment was reported to and concurred with by both the AFSRB and the Office of
Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Integrated Mission Assurance Review (IMAR).
Additionally, it should be noted that RFA 20 addresses a matter of mission success on
what is characterized as a high risk flight research experiment. Safety of the flight crews,
ground personnel and the general public are not impacted by this particular issue and
therefore would not be affected by the final outcome.
Findings / Root Cause / Observations
Findings:
The X-43A FRR process has been exercised with monitoring/observation from the
NESC.
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The NESC has verified that the X-43A FRR process adequately reviewed, investigated
and responded to the aerodynamic dissenting opinion (RFA 20)
The X-43A FRR process is sufficiently independent of the program
The X-43A FRR team employed the appropriate technical expertise in their
assessment
The X-43 FRR process has assured that the program address the overarching issues raised
in RFA 20
The FRR process has refuted the dissenting opinions higher level of risk and
independently confirmed the programs defined level of risk. As a result, HR No. 2602
remains classified as (II/D – Loss of Vehicle/Unlikely to Occur).
The FRR and NESC presented the summation of these findings at the AFSRB, February
9, 2004 and at the Headquarters Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) IMAR
on March 11, 2004.
An AFSRB action to directly report the final disposition of the RFA 20 issues to Mr.
Wood was subsequently completed by both the FRR committee and the NESC ITA/I
lead.
Recommendation
The NESC has determined that no further action is required.
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Minority Report (dissenting opinions)
No dissenting opinions within the NESC.
It should be noted that the dissenting opinion initiator maintains his initial position. He
has documented these continuing concerns (Reference 5) to the FRR committee, the
NESC and the LaRC Director.
X-43A Dissenting Opinion NESC Evaluation Lessons Learned
The following lessons learned address both the general nature of this evaluation and
subsequent response to the dissenting opinion as well as the X-43A FRR Process and its
application to a wider range of NASA programs.
The X-43A Flight Readiness Review (FRR) process defined in Dryden Handbook DHB-
X-001, Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review, Independent Review, Mission Success
Review, Technical Brief and Mini-Tech Brief Guidelines, appears to be an excellent FRR
process that
• Provides an alternative approach to the more traditional single meeting method
• Avoids the potential for the large data dump and “rubber stamp” type review
• Allows for FRR initiated actions, necessary response time and appropriate follow
up on the identified technical issues.
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• Provides a mechanism for dissenting opinions via Request For Action (RFA)
• Is independently established from outside the program
• Can draw on the necessary expertise and skills from across the agency as required
• Reports independently to the Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Board
(AFSRB) on a programs flight readiness
Potential issues related to the process are
• Extensive interfacing between the independent review committee and the program
can potentially lead to a situation wherein the FRR members become advocates
and fail to maintain their critical thinking and independence although oversight
from the Center Chief Engineer helps prevent this form occurring.
• Reliance of the project on the FRR committee for advice on how to meet the
requirements of the ARSFB
Note: The Center Chief Engineer, who commissions the FRR with inputs from the
S&MA director, chairs the AFSRB and provides independent oversight to prevent
either situation. In either case, it is the FRR that presents a report and briefing to
the AFSRB which is comprised of senior management. This provides yet another
check on the independence between the project and the FRR committee
A possible alternative is that the FRR could be comprised of two components. A
continuous beginning to end group to maintain continuity and a rotation of specific
experts to provide "new blood" and ensure a critical review aspect is maintained.
The NESC as well as the agency needs a strategy for addressing dissenting opinions.
Several issues must be considered including,
• It is in NASA’s best interest to create an environment that encourages dissenting
opinions within its programs
• Policy on the appropriateness for referring to existing independent authority.
Note: The NESC wants to encourage programs to use existing independent
technical forums – With the NESC available for a 2nd look only as required.
• The necessary monitoring and follow up requirements on referred items
• Potential for large resource commitment working phantom issues.
Note: If misdirected can distract limited program resources from other more
critical areas of concern.
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